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I. Introduction
In 1986, David Lucas invested in oceanfront property on the
Isle of Palms at a cost of $975,000. In 1988, South Carolina en-
acted the Beachfront Management Act,' and a "baseline" erosion
zone was established at the most landward points of erosion dur-
ing the prior forty years. From this baseline, the council estab-
lished a setback line landward of the baseline by a distance of
forty times the annual erosion rate, but not less than twenty feet.
The Lucas property was inside this setback line, rendering it
worthless, and setting in motion his claim for just compensation
for a taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2
* Dr. Victoria Sutton is an Associate Professor at Texas Tech University School
of Law, and an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of Environmental and Human
Health, Lubbock, Texas. She received a J.D. magna cum laude from American Uni-
versity, Washington College of Law; a Ph.D. in Environmental Sciences from the Uni-
versity of Texas at Dallas; a Master's degree in Public Administration from Old
Dominion University; and two Bachelor of Science degrees in Animal Science and Zo-
ology cum laude from North Carolina State University. Dr. Sutton served in the Bush
Administration in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the Office of Policy,
Planning and Evaluation. She later served as Assistant Director in the Office of Sci-
ence and Technology Policy in the White House, where she was responsible for the
coordination of science and technology research programs among the federal depart-
ments and agencies - the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and
Technology.
1. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-360 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1989) [hereinafter South
Carolina Beachfront Management Act of 1988].
2. See States: Land Use Regulation: Compensation of Private Property Owner, 60
U.S.L.W. 3609 (Mar. 10, 1992) [hereinafter States: Land Use Regulation].
505
1
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
David Lucas was successful in his claim, but at a cost of four years
and two million dollars; $500,000 of which was in payment of at-
torneys' fees required to claim his victory.3 The expense of enforc-
ing a takings claim and the standard that "all economically
beneficial use of land" must be taken from the property before
compensation can be awarded suggests that the Supreme Court
may have provided takings jurisprudence for only the narrowest
of cases. 4
This paper surveys the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Commission5 and examines the impact
that this decision has had on private property rights. The paper
also reviews the Supreme Court history of Commerce Clause juris-
prudence and takings jurisprudence - those cases which provided
precedent for the Lucas opinion. The paper then concludes with
observations on the impact that the Lucas decision has had other
cases and on the private lives of citizens, and whether or not the
decision really had a significant impact on takings jurisprudence.
II. Commerce Clause History in the Supreme Court
The Commerce Clause is the Constitutional basis for Congres-
sional authority over navigable waterways, such as wetlands.6 In
a landmark Supreme Court case, Gibbons v. Ogden,7 Justice Mar-
shall defined "commerce among the States" as "commerce which
concerns more states than one," which includes any activities
which "affect the states generally."8 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that the state could not control navigable routes of
trade and commerce within its borders because the ultimate effect
would be a restraint of free commerce among the states.9 This es-
tablished federal control of navigable waterways.
But this power was not unlimited. The Commerce Clause
granted power to Congress, but the dormant Commerce Clause
granted all powers to the states that were not specifically enumer-
3. See Max Kidalov, H. 3591: Affirming Traditional Principles of Protection of
Private Property and the Environment, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 296-97 (1997).
4. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1018
(1992).
5. See generally 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. See generally 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
8. Id. at 194-95.




ated as powers of Congress. 10 The first case to examine the dor-
mant commerce clause is Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. ,"
wherein Chief Justice Marshall held that a state has power to al-
low a dam to be built across a navigable creek flowing into the
Delaware River, based upon its importance to flood control and
public health.1 2 This dormant Commerce Clause decision as-
serted a right that is not explicitly authorized by the Constitution.
The counsel for the state, William Wirt, argued against navigabil-
ity by referring to the creek as, "one of those sluggish, reptile
streams that do not run but creep, and which wherever it passes,
spreads its venom, and destroys the health of all those who in-
habit its marshes."1 3 He was arguing against navigability which
would make this stream subject to state control as well as arguing
the public health aspect-a power of the states.1 4 Although the
court did find the creek navigable, the state succeeded on the pub-
lic health issue, establishing a source of state power in the dor-
mant commerce clause.15
In addition to the plenary power of Congress concerning com-
merce, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, commonly
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), specifically states that the
goal of the Act is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."1 6 The basis for
this law is the "Commerce Clause" authority exercised by
Congress.
The recent case, United States v. Lopez, 17 created a limitation
on the plenary power of Congress through the Commerce
Clause.18 However, at a time when Congress enjoyed almost un-
limited plenary power through the Commerce Clause, the reach of
the CWA was extended to delegate power to the federal govern-
ment "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biologi-
10. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) The Supreme Court has relied on the Commerce Clause, as supported by
the Supremacy Clause, to infer the policing power of the dormant Commerce Clause.
See id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); and U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
11. See generally 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
12. See id. at 252.
13. Id. at 249.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 252.
16. Clean Water Act (CWA) § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
17. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18. See id. at 600.
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cal integrity of the Nation's waters," 19 preempting states' control
over water pollution. As the delegation of this broad power grew
to include wetlands, 20 conflicts with property law, not heretofore
encountered, arose.
III. History of Constitutional Taking in the Supreme Court
To understand the present takings doctrine, it is helpful to
examine the case law that laid the groundwork for regulatory tak-
ings. One of the earliest cases to concern a Fifth Amendment tak-
ings claim through the implementation of an environmental
statute was the 1894 decision of Lawton v. Steele.21 A New York
statute provided for the confiscation of "fishing nets and other par-
aphernalia," and further provided that the game warden should
destroy the nets in order to prevent over-fishing in particular bod-
ies of water.22 The game warden did confiscate and destroy some
nets.23 The fishermen, finding their nets destroyed, brought a
takings action against the state authority. The court held (with
three justices dissenting) that "the legislature has no right arbi-
trarily to declare that to be a nuisance which is clearly not so; a
good deal must be left to its discretion in that regard,"24 and found
no taking. Thereafter, environmental regulation, rooted in theo-
ries of nuisance, enjoyed favor, with the broadest discretion being
given to the legislatures to decide what was a nuisance.
Much later, the Supreme Court, in the 1922 landmark case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,25 established that compensation
must be provided when government regulation "goes too far," and
in so doing, diminishes the value of private property.26 Six years
later, however, the Supreme Court decided in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge that there was no taking where the regulation was
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
20. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1998). The term "wetlands" is not found in the
original CWA, and only through administrative rulemaking did wetlands become reg-
ulated through the CWA. The term waters of the United States is defined to include,
"All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams [including intermittent
streams], mud flats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, play lakes, or
natural ponds. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
21. See generally 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
22. Id. at 135.
23. See id. at 134.
24. See id. at 140.
25. See generally 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).




purpose. 27 Fifty years later, the "goes too far" standard was reex-
amined in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,28
and an additional test was developed. The Supreme Court re-
quired the application of this test to the taking in order to deter-
mine the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct
"investment-backed expectations." 29 Two years later, the Su-
preme Court did not apply the "investment-backed expectations"
criteria established in Penn Central to Agins v. City of Tiburon.30
Instead, the Court applied a type of corollary to Penn Central -
that the regulation is not a taking where the governmental action
"substantially advances legitimate state interests."31 The next
year, the Supreme Court applied the Agins test in San Diego Gas
v. City of San Diego,32 and the "investment-backed expectations"
test was not part of the criteria. In foresight, Justice Brennan, in
his dissent, argued for extending the Takings Clause to regula-
tions that result in the "destruction of the use and enjoyment of
private property."33
The use of "character of the government action" is a test ap-
plied to the wetlands permit denial process, suggested in the
landmark case Pennsylvania Coal in an opinion by Justice
Holmes, which made the government action prong the basis of all
takings analyses, with the standard that a taking had been ef-
fected when government action "goes too far."34 This test, first ar-
ticulated in Penn Central, was the progenitor of the "substantially
advances legitimate state interests" test articulated two years
later in Agins. 35 The existence of these tests led to the statement
by the United States Environmental Protection Agency - in a
memorandum from the General Counsel to the Administrator -
that the denial of a CWA Section 404 wetlands permit "is a legiti-
27. See 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
28. 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
29. See id. at 138 Using these criteria, the court found there was no taking be-
cause the public purpose served was sufficient to allow the government action without
compensation, and the ability of Penn Central Transportation Company to use its
property to build in other ways did not create a major negative impact on the com-
pany or interfere with its "investment-backed expectations." See generally id.
30. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
31. Id. at 260.
32. See generally San Diego Gas v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 628 (1981).
33. Id. at 651-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
35. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
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mate state interest, which Congress has recognized under Section
404, and which the permit denial substantially advanced."36
The Supreme Court seemed ready to address the issues of
regulatory takings (beyond physical takings), and in a landmark
decision, only six years after San Diego Gas, the compensation for
regulatory takings was revisited in First Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles.37 The Supreme Court recognized that even
a temporary taking can be a compensable one under the Fifth
Amendment. The compensation remedy was held to be fair value
for the use of the property during that period. 38 Again, the move-
ment away from physical takings was supported by the recogni-
tion that a taking could still occur without permanency. That
same year, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,39 the Su-
preme Court heightened the standard for governmental action in
a compensable taking to include a requirement for an "essential
nexus" between the legitimate state interest and the state
action.40
Five years later, in 1992, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Commission, the Supreme Court for the first time found that an
environmental regulation had effected a compensable taking
when the governmental action essentially removed all value from
the property.41 The Lucas decision, while applying to only a very
narrow set of cases where all value was taken through regulation,
did not itself represent a major change. However, this Lucas deci-
sion provided the background for takings jurisprudence which
would open the door to the concept of partial takings. Prior to the
Lucas case there had been essentially no discussion of situations
where the taking action was incomplete or partial in terms of its
impact on the value of the property in question.
IV. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
What led to the rise of Lucas to the U.S. Supreme Court?
In South Carolina, the issue of the 1988 Beachfront Manage-
ment Act was creating both administrative and judicial problems
36. Memorandum from E. Donald Elliott, Assistant Administrator, General
Counsel, to William Reilly, Administrator (November 23, 1990) (on file with author).
(regarding takings issues raised by Congressional letters concerning wetlands cases).
37. See First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
38. See id. at 314.
39. See generally 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
40. See id. at 834.




for the state.42 One property owner brought a takings action
based on the denial of a permit to build a bulkhead on his beach-
front property, and there was no provision for such permits under
the Act.43 In Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council,44 the court
rejected the Beards' takings claim, basing its ruling on a "substan-
tial and legitimate state interest."45 The Beards did not appeal.
In Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council,4 6 the court again
denied a takings claim which had been based on the denial of a
permit for a bulkhead.47 The legislature responded and amended
the Act to allow a "special permit" for such applications. 48 The
Supreme Court may have been influenced to take the Lucas case
as the most egregious of the takings cases; however, the petition
for certiorari filed on behalf of Esposito during the same session
was denied. 49 Perhaps the presence of more than one takings case
challenging the South Carolina law served to heighten the impor-
tance of the Court's decision regarding Lucas. Clearly, there was
trouble with the South Carolina statute.
The Lucas case.
The facts in the Lucas case are unusual, in that after the
property had been purchased by David Lucas, the South Carolina
Coastal Council created a new baseline for coastal protection land-
ward of the Lucas' properties, making construction illegal. There-
fore, when David Lucas purchased his lots on the Isle of Palms, he
clearly had "investment-backed expectations" and clearly in-
tended to construct dwellings on the property.50 There was liter-
ally nothing David Lucas could do with his property, even far
short of his investment-backed expectations. The transcript
shows that the evidence demonstrated there was "no value" re-
maining in the property. 51 When Camden Lewis, the attorney for
David Lucas, was arguing the case before the Supreme Court, Jus-
42. See South Carolina Beachfront Management Act of 1988, supra note 1.
43. See Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 403 S.E.2d 620, 621 n.1 (S.C.
1991) (the court determined that the Beards' application, based on its submission
date, was governed under the 1977 Coastal Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-39
(Law Co-op 1977)).
44. See id. at 622.
45. See id.
46. See generally 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992).
47. See id. at 168.
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law Co-op, Supp. 1990).
49. See Esposito, 505 U.S. 1219.
50. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 404 S.E.2d 895,896 (S.C. 1991).
51. Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Comm'n, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991) (No. 89
CP 10 0066); Record at 67.
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tice Blackmun asked, "Are you saying Mr. Lucas' land was 'com-
pletely worthless?"'5 2 He then added, "Would you give it to me?"53
To that, Mr. Lewis replied, "Yes, if the taxes were paid on it."54 In
contrast, Mugler v. Kansas55 was distinguishable because not all
uses were taken by the regulation, and the value of the property
was more than zero.56 The distinction can be made that Lucas
applies to property which loses all value, and particularly to prop-
erty which lost its value after purchase of the property. The uni-
verse of situations to which this would apply is, as noted above,
relatively small.
What did Lucas add to the takings jurisprudence?
Some scholars have observed that the Lucas decision is "enig-
matic."5 7 Other writers have found Lucas to be "signifying noth-
ing."5 8 But Lucas was not "signifying nothing" as some authors
have noted, although its significance may be different than ex-
pected. As a result of Lucas, the Federal Circuits have relied upon
this precedent in the establishment of subsequent takings juris-
prudence for partial takings-those cases, which do not result in a
taking of all value from the land. Further, the Supreme Court has
chosen not to review those cases on certiorari, allowing the Fed-
eral Circuit's analysis to stand, thereby leaving partial takings as
a fundamental doctrine for regulators.
The doctrine of partial takings arose just two years after Lu-
cas and was the precedent the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit needed to address the issues in Florida Rock
Industries v. United States.59 The issue of the denial of a CWA
Section 404 permit for private property resulted in the finding of a
partial taking. Through the application of the Takings Clause,
governmental action was limited by requiring compensation for
not only full takings as in Lucas, but also for a partial diminution
of value resulting in a partial taking. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari upholding compensation for partial takings for wetlands
52. States: Land Use Regulation, supra note 2.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
56. See id.
57. Joseph Sax, Lucas and the Takings Saga in the U.S. Supreme Court, Presen-
tation at the University of California at Los Angeles School of Public Policy and
School of Law (Dec. 3, 1992).
58. Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 12 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 439 (1993).




preservation through the CWA. Loveladies Harbor v. United
States,60 decided later the same year, further sharpened the test
for partial takings in another Section 404 permit denial.
6 1
Challenges by private property owners for a denial of a Sec-
tion 404 permit have also been based on the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In Loveladies Har-
bor Inc. v. Baldwin,62 a due process argument was made, but the
court held that the administrative process in use was satisfac-
tory.63 The due process prong of a takings analysis is still impor-
tant, but alone, it cannot result in the finding of a compensable
taking. The remedy for a due process finding is invalidation of the
regulation and damages; whereas the remedy for a compensable
taking is compensation. 64 No due process challenges have been
successful in finding that the denial of a wetlands permit was un-
constitutional (without also finding a compensable taking). Ap-
plying this reasoning in Florida Rock, Judge Plager found that
"the Supreme Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. Los Angeles, makes clear that compensation for
loss, not invalidation of an offending regulation, is the remedy for
violation of the takings clause."65
V. Subsequent Cases and the Effect of Lucas
Jurisdiction for Constitutional takings cases is complex and
may have limited the challenges or applications of Lucas. A prop-
erty owner that is denied a wetlands permit under Section 404 of
the CWA may seek judicial review of the permit decision in U.S.
District Court. However, if that same owner wants to file a tak-
ings claim, it can be done in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.66
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction in
cases involving more than $10,000, and shares concurrent juris-
diction with U.S. District Courts for takings cases not exceeding
$10,000.67 Judicial review of a permit denial in District Court and
60. See generally 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
61. See id. at 1180.
62. See generally Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. Baldwin, Civil No. 82-1948, 1984 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18716 (D.N.J. March 12, 1984).
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due
Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695 (1993).
65. 18 F.3d at 1570; see also James L. Huffman, Judge Plager's 'Sea Change' in
Regulatory Takings Law, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 597 (1995).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
67. See id. § 1346.
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a takings claim in the Federal Circuit are permissible at the same
time.68 However, if this procedure is followed, the Federal Circuit
will likely stay the action pending the resolution of the challenge
to the permit denial.69
One writer examined the impact of Lucas on state courts' de-
cisions through a LEXIS search from the time of the decision,
1992, to January 15, 1995.70 The result demonstrated that sur-
prisingly few decisions even mentioned the Lucas case. For all
states, eighty cases referred to the Lucas decision. Of those, fifty-
seven cases discussed the Lucas case, as opposed to merely citing
the case without discussing it. In all eighty cases, only three re-
lied on Lucas in finding a regulatory taking.71 However, upon re-
view of these cases, one of them was reversed by the Colorado
Supreme Court.72 A review of all state cases citing Lucas through
June 12, 2000, totaled 335. Since 1995, the impact of Lucas in
state courts has increased slightly, being cited 177 times from
1996 through June 12, 2000, with fifty of those cases citing Lucas
as a distinguishing case or in the dissent.
Lucas has also been mentioned in other novel applications be-
cause of the regulatory takings theory represented. The variety of
cases have included rent control, quarry regulation, permit deni-
als for small lots, sea wall construction, wetland and floodplain
building, and conditional use permit cases. Some state courts do
not give Lucas any effect, finding that a state law applies or that
the case fits under Justice Scalia's exceptions for nuisance. 73
Another decision came before the Federal Circuit, which con-
sidered the taking of a reversionary interest in property through
the "rails-to-trails" program, which sought to preserve otherwise
abandoned railroad easements for development into trails by tech-
68. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545; see also Gunn v.
United States Dep't of Agric., 118 F.3d 1233 (8th Cir. 1997).
69. See Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
70. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of The United States Supreme
Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does The Supreme Court Really
Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 523, 537-541 (1995).
71. See, e.g., Moroney v. Mayor & City Council, 633 A.2d 1045 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993); People ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Diversified Props. Co. III, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); The Mill v. State Dep't of Health, 868 P.2d 1099
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
72. See State Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994).
73. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992),
affd, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (customary beach
rights were at issue where the city denied the owner permission to build a sea wall




nically suspending the reversionary interest of the property
owner. 74 In Presault v. United States75 the court vacated an ear-
lier decision and found in favor of the government in the "rails-to-
trails" program. Thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment against the
Presaults and remanded.76 Lucas was cited in the concurrence for
the proposition that state law must be examined because it is the
state law "to which the Fifth Amendment rights attach."77
Lucas has often been distinguished on the basis of the total
diminution in value which occurred in the taking of all use of the
coastal lots. It was thought that the rare occasion for a total dimi-
nution would render Lucas fairly inconsequential. Yet in a recent
case, Palm Beach Isle Assoc. v. United States,78 a total diminution
in value was found where the subject parcels lost all value as a
result of the denial of a CWA Section 404 permit.79 In fact, the
analysis of the taking was clarified where the court opined that
the investment-backed expectation was irrelevant when the de-
nial had resulted in this total diminution.80
What has happened to David Lucas?
David Lucas received compensation of $850,000 for the two
lots plus $725,000 in interest, attorney's fees, and costs totaling
$1.575 million. South Carolina then resold the lots to a construc-
tion company for $785,000.81
David Lucas founded the Council on Property Rights, an or-
ganization with the goal of promoting the Florida Property Rights
Act, a state law which protects private property rights, 2 and the
passage of a South Carolina property rights bill.3 His objective
was to make the compensation process more accessible to any citi-
74. See National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(a)
(1994).
75. 66 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated on reh'g en banc, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
76. The majority opinion was written by Judge S. Jay Plager, joined by Judges
Rich, Newman and Mayer; with a concurring opinion by Judge Rader joined by Judge
Lourie; and a dissenting opinion by Judge Clevenger, joined by Judges Michel and
Schall. See generally id.
77. 100 F.3d at 1556.
78. 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
79. See id. at 1378-79.
80. See id. at 1381.
81. See Rosenberg, supra note 70, at 545 n.112.
82. See Kidalov, supra note 3, at 296.
83. See H.R. 3591, 112th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997). The bill passed by a roll call
vote of seventy-eight yeas to thirty-five nays. FINAL DIGEST OF SENATE AND HOUSE
BILLS AND RESOLUTION, 112th Leg., 1st Sess., at 64 (1997).
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zen, not just those who were wealthy enough to fund a war chest
adequately large enough to assert their property rights. Mr. Lu-
cas has expressed the opinion that states will ignore the Supreme
Court ruling of his case without corresponding state property
rights legislation. 4
In 1994, the National Wildlife Federation sponsored a survey
of national registered voters who voted in Congressional elec-
tions.8 5 In that survey 1,201 respondents were asked whether
property owners should be compensated for takings resulting from
environmental regulations. Although the question was styled in a
way most favorable to the policy position of the sponsor of the sur-
vey,8 6 thirty-four percent thought that property owners should be
compensated, while fifty-six percent thought that property owners
should not be compensated.8 7
VI. Conclusion
Perhaps the Lucas case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court
because it appeared that the regulatory takings actions were so
egregious with this particular South Carolina statute (because it
provided for no exceptions or a permitting system) that the result-
ing controversy had to be resolved. The impact of the case has
resulted in the basis for a constitutional takings doctrine that pro-
vides the needed Supreme Court guidance on the issue. The hopes
of opponents of the Lucas decision that it would apply only to the
narrowest of cases where all value was taken by the regulation,
while true in a direct sense, did not account for the profound indi-
rect impacts of Lucas. The reliance upon Lucas for the establish-
ment of partial takings in opinions by the Federal Circuit, and the
84. See David H. Lucas, South Carolina Policy Council Capital Comment No. 46,
It Could Happen to You (Sept. 1994).
85. See Peter D. Hart, A Post Election Voter Survey (Dec. 1-4, 1994) (unpublished
research prepared for the Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, on file with author).
86. See id. The question was read on the telephone as follows:
Here is the final pair of statements. Please tell me which one comes
closer to your own opinion. Statement A: Some people say that the gov-
ernment and taxpayers should pay financial compensation to property
owners - including developers and homeowners - if environmental laws
restrict their constitutional right to do anything they want with their
land. Statement B: Other people say that the government and taxpayers
should not pay financial compensation to property owners - including de-
velopers and homeowners - if environmental laws restrict what they do
with their land, because people should not be paid to obey laws that are






apparent subsequent reluctance by the Supreme Court to review
the Federal Circuit decisions, or the reluctance of litigants to seek
adjudication beyond the Federal Circuit, suggests that the Fed-
eral Circuit may be the ipso facto court of last resort for takings -
at least for now.
Legislation has been proposed in Congress to address com-
pensation to landowners whose land values have been diminished
by regulation. In March 1995, the U.S. House of Representatives
voted 277 to 148 on H.R. 9, a bill requiring compensation for land-
owners where property values were reduced by twenty percent or
more. Other proposals required as much as a forty percent reduc-
tion in value to gain compensation, but all proposals ultimately
failed to pass the Congress. No legislation introduced since 1996
achieved the momentum as did that of H.R. 9. Several states did
consider takings legislation and three states - Florida, Louisiana
and Texas - have enacted such legislation. Other states have con-
sidered takings issues by voter referenda, but so far such efforts
have failed.88 Given the narrow holding in Lucas, the effects on
policy and legislation at the state level are nonetheless significant.
Since Lucas, the state must consider the ultimate cost of denying
a landowner a CWA permit. In addition, the development of par-
tial takings doctrines, as well as those based on reversionary in-
terest takings, clearly relies on a Lucas analysis. The Federal
Circuit's role as the court of last resort for federal takings actions
has been an outgrowth of the Lucas decision, and it will determine
which cases are heard in the foreseeable future.
88. Arizona (1994) and Washington (1995).
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